A couple of years ago I wrote a more modern assessment of Boyd, specifically his impact on the Marine Corps, which can be found for free at the link below or by emailing the Marine Corps University Press (mcu_press@usmcu.edu) for a free hard copy:
It includes a lot of material not covered either at all, or in detail, in Coram’s book, especially primary source analysis of Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” briefing, and the OODA loop. I think the OODA loop itself is quite misunderstood and often presented in ways that Boyd himself never presented it. With due respect to the author above, if understood in the Boyd intended it is much more than a device for rapid tactical action; reading my book, and Osinga’s as well, makes that clearer.
ML-This was really interesting and a good read, thanks for posting. However, I came away from this less, not more, impressed with Boyd overall. As an example, turning down requests for "shorter versions of the 6-hour briefing" seems more indicative of obstinacy than anything that should be held up as to be emulated. I can't help but think that such a brilliant and dedicated individual would have had more impact in his lifetime if he had been a bit more flexible and spent more time strategizing on how to best see his ideas accepted and adopted... in comparison to the investment he put into maintaining his intellectual purity/independence. To me, this triggered echoes of the "Kent-Kendall Debate" which I used as reading for my grad school class last week: https://thecsi.org.uk/isi/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Kent-Kendall-Debate.pdf?0856f5 Since the 1940's, the US intelligence literature has struggled with the priority of maintaining intellectual independence ("Truth to Power") versus having a closer relationship with decisionmakers that enables impact/relevance. "Truth to Power" matters a lot less when you never get to speak to power, power ignores you, or you're speaking "truth" on issues that don't actually affect key decisions. Over time, the consensus has grown that these considerations need to be carefully balanced, and mechanisms put in place to tighten relationships with decisionmakers, while also establishing firewalls that preserve intellectual independence for analysts. After reading this, I don't think Boyd got this balance quite right. Could he not have had more impact if he had been less extreme in his approach? Could he not have been more flexible without becoming a "sycophant?" I think so. I'd be interested in your thoughts.
Markus: First, I have to point out that about six years ago I had a brief stint working with Bryan Port in Korea and his shop/shopmates had nothing but the best to say about you and your work. And having read your insightful comments, I can see why. Second, I think there's more convergence than divergence in our view of Boyd. He was, no doubt, obstinate in several respects. I agree with everything you write above, with the exception of one word: "balanced." My sense is that - and this is a wide generalization - too many hierarchical organizations are far out of balance when it comes to a willingness to entertain new or challenging ideas. And so I wrote the essay to put forward a reason why that is (financial and status pressures), and one person who figured out a way to break the model to achieve change (albeit at a literal personal cost). Another way we might think about someone like Boyd is to look back and reflect whether he was "right." The analytical community does this a bit, and Tetlock's Good Judgment Project has advocated for this sort of self-assessment, but I think that when we consider the value of Truth-to-Power folks like Boyd, we've got to look at the full picture - how correct were his ideas about the use of force versus his Pentagon adversaries? Power always eventually bows to truth, so it matters whose version of truth more correctly conformed with how the real world played out. (Admittedly, we can't figure that out until the timeline moves right a ways.) I've got to get back to work, but I want to thank you for such a thoughtful response - this is precisely what I was hoping for when I launched the site because I feel like so much social media inevitably seems to drift towards a few hundred characters of hate - and this was exactly the opposite. All best & thanks, Matt
Mister_G_2, I too came away from the article disappointed in Boyd's unwillingness to tailor his presentations for various audiences. The word that came to my mind was arrogant. Makes you wonder how many people missed an opportunity to gain from his wisdom due to his inability to provide executive summaries of his ideas.
I appreciated the article's tone. What I got from it was we often glorify Boyd for his achievements and miss out on how he achieved such reverence. It was his adherence to a personal philosophy, a code of sorts, that allowed him to be beholden to no one and become someone who we speak about to this day. As the article rightly pointed out, we often avoid conflict, even forsaking our personal values to gain favor or, in a much more innocent sense, avoid losing our jobs. ML articulates a fundamental truth, when you have something at stake you're far more likely to be a yes man or women, which often prevents us from expressing our genuine feelings. This prevents us from achieving our own personal code. Great food for thought and a powerful lesson.
Look online for Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd by Frans Osinga. Quite interesting as well.
Max Brooks succinctly said once that there is Courage under Fire, and Courage under Pressure. IMHO the second one allows independence in any organization, because it makes you free to accept consequences if you do what you think is right without deprive those in your circle with what they wish for their paths. Sort of a path in the middle. However, paths in the middle are hard to see and harder to walk...
Osinga's book is a much better representation of Boyd's ideas than Coram or Hammond (though those biographies are a great read!), I think you'll enjoy it.
Sir - thank you for writing this article. I feel like many organizations struggle with planning for and implementing strategies (at all levels) because we do not dedicate the necessary resources - namely time - to truly understand what we are planning for. I can only imagine forcing a senior leader to sit through a six-hour mission analysis brief! The idea that we shouldn't deliver bad news or contrasting viewpoints to the boss stifles the critical thinking needed to solve problems and craft strategy. I agree it is often difficult to overcome organizational inertia when the system is set up in a way that promotes the status quo. In many ways material wealth, status, rank, and power get in the way of what an organization is trying to accomplish. Thanks again for sharing your thoughts!
Downsizing has both advantages and disadvantages; avoiding quid pro quo is more sideshow distraction than then disruptive ideas Boyd wanted to inject into the defense bureaucracy. Near zero material wealth may help clear mental distraction and provide a gimmick to help communicate ideas to those who hold unquestioned assumptions about post military work. In other words, like Zeno, Boyd used his impoverished lifestyle as a way to challenge sacred assumptions and thereby get people to view his disruptive ideas as useful.
Thanks William! I considered a reference to Diogenes in the essay, but left it aside in the end, and I'm glad you brought ancient Greece back into the conversation!
Great article, and extremely pertinent to business strategists too. When career advancement is predicated on short-term business development, it’s really difficult to provide honest strategic advice if courage can ruffle client feathers but boot-licking ensures achieving the up-or-out budgeted targets.
Reducing our dependency is one way to fight against this. Having strong principles/ values/ sense of integrity is another. We quite clearly need them both.
A couple of years ago I wrote a more modern assessment of Boyd, specifically his impact on the Marine Corps, which can be found for free at the link below or by emailing the Marine Corps University Press (mcu_press@usmcu.edu) for a free hard copy:
https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/ANewConceptionOfWar.pdf?ver=2018-11-08-094859-167
It includes a lot of material not covered either at all, or in detail, in Coram’s book, especially primary source analysis of Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” briefing, and the OODA loop. I think the OODA loop itself is quite misunderstood and often presented in ways that Boyd himself never presented it. With due respect to the author above, if understood in the Boyd intended it is much more than a device for rapid tactical action; reading my book, and Osinga’s as well, makes that clearer.
Thanks Ian, I'll check it out, always appreciate a good read and tip.
Thank You for your book, although I like Coram's book,
there is not enough information about his thought processes and patterns,
He was an amazing thinker, strategist and Pathfinder.
ML-This was really interesting and a good read, thanks for posting. However, I came away from this less, not more, impressed with Boyd overall. As an example, turning down requests for "shorter versions of the 6-hour briefing" seems more indicative of obstinacy than anything that should be held up as to be emulated. I can't help but think that such a brilliant and dedicated individual would have had more impact in his lifetime if he had been a bit more flexible and spent more time strategizing on how to best see his ideas accepted and adopted... in comparison to the investment he put into maintaining his intellectual purity/independence. To me, this triggered echoes of the "Kent-Kendall Debate" which I used as reading for my grad school class last week: https://thecsi.org.uk/isi/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Kent-Kendall-Debate.pdf?0856f5 Since the 1940's, the US intelligence literature has struggled with the priority of maintaining intellectual independence ("Truth to Power") versus having a closer relationship with decisionmakers that enables impact/relevance. "Truth to Power" matters a lot less when you never get to speak to power, power ignores you, or you're speaking "truth" on issues that don't actually affect key decisions. Over time, the consensus has grown that these considerations need to be carefully balanced, and mechanisms put in place to tighten relationships with decisionmakers, while also establishing firewalls that preserve intellectual independence for analysts. After reading this, I don't think Boyd got this balance quite right. Could he not have had more impact if he had been less extreme in his approach? Could he not have been more flexible without becoming a "sycophant?" I think so. I'd be interested in your thoughts.
Markus: First, I have to point out that about six years ago I had a brief stint working with Bryan Port in Korea and his shop/shopmates had nothing but the best to say about you and your work. And having read your insightful comments, I can see why. Second, I think there's more convergence than divergence in our view of Boyd. He was, no doubt, obstinate in several respects. I agree with everything you write above, with the exception of one word: "balanced." My sense is that - and this is a wide generalization - too many hierarchical organizations are far out of balance when it comes to a willingness to entertain new or challenging ideas. And so I wrote the essay to put forward a reason why that is (financial and status pressures), and one person who figured out a way to break the model to achieve change (albeit at a literal personal cost). Another way we might think about someone like Boyd is to look back and reflect whether he was "right." The analytical community does this a bit, and Tetlock's Good Judgment Project has advocated for this sort of self-assessment, but I think that when we consider the value of Truth-to-Power folks like Boyd, we've got to look at the full picture - how correct were his ideas about the use of force versus his Pentagon adversaries? Power always eventually bows to truth, so it matters whose version of truth more correctly conformed with how the real world played out. (Admittedly, we can't figure that out until the timeline moves right a ways.) I've got to get back to work, but I want to thank you for such a thoughtful response - this is precisely what I was hoping for when I launched the site because I feel like so much social media inevitably seems to drift towards a few hundred characters of hate - and this was exactly the opposite. All best & thanks, Matt
Mister_G_2, I too came away from the article disappointed in Boyd's unwillingness to tailor his presentations for various audiences. The word that came to my mind was arrogant. Makes you wonder how many people missed an opportunity to gain from his wisdom due to his inability to provide executive summaries of his ideas.
Boyd pierced the good old boys club with his eclectic mix of energy, obstinacy,
and unprecedented determination and ability to surmount roadblocks,
and square up with corrupt Civilians and Generals
I appreciated the article's tone. What I got from it was we often glorify Boyd for his achievements and miss out on how he achieved such reverence. It was his adherence to a personal philosophy, a code of sorts, that allowed him to be beholden to no one and become someone who we speak about to this day. As the article rightly pointed out, we often avoid conflict, even forsaking our personal values to gain favor or, in a much more innocent sense, avoid losing our jobs. ML articulates a fundamental truth, when you have something at stake you're far more likely to be a yes man or women, which often prevents us from expressing our genuine feelings. This prevents us from achieving our own personal code. Great food for thought and a powerful lesson.
For what it's worth Joshua, I think until you've got something like a personal code to stand for, it's pretty hard to be a strategist.
Which is seen far too often in the lairs of Power, and in Military and Civilian Organizations
Look online for Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd by Frans Osinga. Quite interesting as well.
Max Brooks succinctly said once that there is Courage under Fire, and Courage under Pressure. IMHO the second one allows independence in any organization, because it makes you free to accept consequences if you do what you think is right without deprive those in your circle with what they wish for their paths. Sort of a path in the middle. However, paths in the middle are hard to see and harder to walk...
All the best!
Thanks much for the reference, I'll be sure to check it out!
Osinga's book is a much better representation of Boyd's ideas than Coram or Hammond (though those biographies are a great read!), I think you'll enjoy it.
Sir - thank you for writing this article. I feel like many organizations struggle with planning for and implementing strategies (at all levels) because we do not dedicate the necessary resources - namely time - to truly understand what we are planning for. I can only imagine forcing a senior leader to sit through a six-hour mission analysis brief! The idea that we shouldn't deliver bad news or contrasting viewpoints to the boss stifles the critical thinking needed to solve problems and craft strategy. I agree it is often difficult to overcome organizational inertia when the system is set up in a way that promotes the status quo. In many ways material wealth, status, rank, and power get in the way of what an organization is trying to accomplish. Thanks again for sharing your thoughts!
Dave - thanks so much for reading this & please do check in from time to time and let me know where you are in the Army and the world. All best, mlc
Downsizing has both advantages and disadvantages; avoiding quid pro quo is more sideshow distraction than then disruptive ideas Boyd wanted to inject into the defense bureaucracy. Near zero material wealth may help clear mental distraction and provide a gimmick to help communicate ideas to those who hold unquestioned assumptions about post military work. In other words, like Zeno, Boyd used his impoverished lifestyle as a way to challenge sacred assumptions and thereby get people to view his disruptive ideas as useful.
Thanks William! I considered a reference to Diogenes in the essay, but left it aside in the end, and I'm glad you brought ancient Greece back into the conversation!
A more cogent example of poverty used to develop and communicate ideas is Diogenes.
"Step out of my light" being one of the all-time.
Gr8 post - thanks for sharing! Re: OODA "loop" & WWI/II, fortunately the Germans didn't user it on the strategic and grand strategic levels 🙃
Muchas gracias Erik for the compliment, and if you liked it, be sure to sign on for future weekly posts!
Great article, and extremely pertinent to business strategists too. When career advancement is predicated on short-term business development, it’s really difficult to provide honest strategic advice if courage can ruffle client feathers but boot-licking ensures achieving the up-or-out budgeted targets.
Reducing our dependency is one way to fight against this. Having strong principles/ values/ sense of integrity is another. We quite clearly need them both.
Need to reference Bill Lind and his novel "Victoria". He is Boyd's successor on 4th Generation Warfare.