A couple of years ago I wrote a more modern assessment of Boyd, specifically his impact on the Marine Corps, which can be found for free at the link below or by emailing the Marine Corps University Press (mcu_press@usmcu.edu) for a free hard copy:
It includes a lot of material not covered either at all, or in detail, in Coram’s book, especially primary source analysis of Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” briefing, and the OODA loop. I think the OODA loop itself is quite misunderstood and often presented in ways that Boyd himself never presented it. With due respect to the author above, if understood in the Boyd intended it is much more than a device for rapid tactical action; reading my book, and Osinga’s as well, makes that clearer.
Look online for Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd by Frans Osinga. Quite interesting as well.
Max Brooks succinctly said once that there is Courage under Fire, and Courage under Pressure. IMHO the second one allows independence in any organization, because it makes you free to accept consequences if you do what you think is right without deprive those in your circle with what they wish for their paths. Sort of a path in the middle. However, paths in the middle are hard to see and harder to walk...
ML-This was really interesting and a good read, thanks for posting. However, I came away from this less, not more, impressed with Boyd overall. As an example, turning down requests for "shorter versions of the 6-hour briefing" seems more indicative of obstinacy than anything that should be held up as to be emulated. I can't help but think that such a brilliant and dedicated individual would have had more impact in his lifetime if he had been a bit more flexible and spent more time strategizing on how to best see his ideas accepted and adopted... in comparison to the investment he put into maintaining his intellectual purity/independence. To me, this triggered echoes of the "Kent-Kendall Debate" which I used as reading for my grad school class last week: https://thecsi.org.uk/isi/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Kent-Kendall-Debate.pdf?0856f5 Since the 1940's, the US intelligence literature has struggled with the priority of maintaining intellectual independence ("Truth to Power") versus having a closer relationship with decisionmakers that enables impact/relevance. "Truth to Power" matters a lot less when you never get to speak to power, power ignores you, or you're speaking "truth" on issues that don't actually affect key decisions. Over time, the consensus has grown that these considerations need to be carefully balanced, and mechanisms put in place to tighten relationships with decisionmakers, while also establishing firewalls that preserve intellectual independence for analysts. After reading this, I don't think Boyd got this balance quite right. Could he not have had more impact if he had been less extreme in his approach? Could he not have been more flexible without becoming a "sycophant?" I think so. I'd be interested in your thoughts.
I appreciated the article's tone. What I got from it was we often glorify Boyd for his achievements and miss out on how he achieved such reverence. It was his adherence to a personal philosophy, a code of sorts, that allowed him to be beholden to no one and become someone who we speak about to this day. As the article rightly pointed out, we often avoid conflict, even forsaking our personal values to gain favor or, in a much more innocent sense, avoid losing our jobs. ML articulates a fundamental truth, when you have something at stake you're far more likely to be a yes man or women, which often prevents us from expressing our genuine feelings. This prevents us from achieving our own personal code. Great food for thought and a powerful lesson.
Sir - thank you for writing this article. I feel like many organizations struggle with planning for and implementing strategies (at all levels) because we do not dedicate the necessary resources - namely time - to truly understand what we are planning for. I can only imagine forcing a senior leader to sit through a six-hour mission analysis brief! The idea that we shouldn't deliver bad news or contrasting viewpoints to the boss stifles the critical thinking needed to solve problems and craft strategy. I agree it is often difficult to overcome organizational inertia when the system is set up in a way that promotes the status quo. In many ways material wealth, status, rank, and power get in the way of what an organization is trying to accomplish. Thanks again for sharing your thoughts!
Downsizing has both advantages and disadvantages; avoiding quid pro quo is more sideshow distraction than then disruptive ideas Boyd wanted to inject into the defense bureaucracy. Near zero material wealth may help clear mental distraction and provide a gimmick to help communicate ideas to those who hold unquestioned assumptions about post military work. In other words, like Zeno, Boyd used his impoverished lifestyle as a way to challenge sacred assumptions and thereby get people to view his disruptive ideas as useful.
A couple of years ago I wrote a more modern assessment of Boyd, specifically his impact on the Marine Corps, which can be found for free at the link below or by emailing the Marine Corps University Press (mcu_press@usmcu.edu) for a free hard copy:
https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/ANewConceptionOfWar.pdf?ver=2018-11-08-094859-167
It includes a lot of material not covered either at all, or in detail, in Coram’s book, especially primary source analysis of Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” briefing, and the OODA loop. I think the OODA loop itself is quite misunderstood and often presented in ways that Boyd himself never presented it. With due respect to the author above, if understood in the Boyd intended it is much more than a device for rapid tactical action; reading my book, and Osinga’s as well, makes that clearer.
Look online for Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd by Frans Osinga. Quite interesting as well.
Max Brooks succinctly said once that there is Courage under Fire, and Courage under Pressure. IMHO the second one allows independence in any organization, because it makes you free to accept consequences if you do what you think is right without deprive those in your circle with what they wish for their paths. Sort of a path in the middle. However, paths in the middle are hard to see and harder to walk...
All the best!
ML-This was really interesting and a good read, thanks for posting. However, I came away from this less, not more, impressed with Boyd overall. As an example, turning down requests for "shorter versions of the 6-hour briefing" seems more indicative of obstinacy than anything that should be held up as to be emulated. I can't help but think that such a brilliant and dedicated individual would have had more impact in his lifetime if he had been a bit more flexible and spent more time strategizing on how to best see his ideas accepted and adopted... in comparison to the investment he put into maintaining his intellectual purity/independence. To me, this triggered echoes of the "Kent-Kendall Debate" which I used as reading for my grad school class last week: https://thecsi.org.uk/isi/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Kent-Kendall-Debate.pdf?0856f5 Since the 1940's, the US intelligence literature has struggled with the priority of maintaining intellectual independence ("Truth to Power") versus having a closer relationship with decisionmakers that enables impact/relevance. "Truth to Power" matters a lot less when you never get to speak to power, power ignores you, or you're speaking "truth" on issues that don't actually affect key decisions. Over time, the consensus has grown that these considerations need to be carefully balanced, and mechanisms put in place to tighten relationships with decisionmakers, while also establishing firewalls that preserve intellectual independence for analysts. After reading this, I don't think Boyd got this balance quite right. Could he not have had more impact if he had been less extreme in his approach? Could he not have been more flexible without becoming a "sycophant?" I think so. I'd be interested in your thoughts.
I appreciated the article's tone. What I got from it was we often glorify Boyd for his achievements and miss out on how he achieved such reverence. It was his adherence to a personal philosophy, a code of sorts, that allowed him to be beholden to no one and become someone who we speak about to this day. As the article rightly pointed out, we often avoid conflict, even forsaking our personal values to gain favor or, in a much more innocent sense, avoid losing our jobs. ML articulates a fundamental truth, when you have something at stake you're far more likely to be a yes man or women, which often prevents us from expressing our genuine feelings. This prevents us from achieving our own personal code. Great food for thought and a powerful lesson.
Sir - thank you for writing this article. I feel like many organizations struggle with planning for and implementing strategies (at all levels) because we do not dedicate the necessary resources - namely time - to truly understand what we are planning for. I can only imagine forcing a senior leader to sit through a six-hour mission analysis brief! The idea that we shouldn't deliver bad news or contrasting viewpoints to the boss stifles the critical thinking needed to solve problems and craft strategy. I agree it is often difficult to overcome organizational inertia when the system is set up in a way that promotes the status quo. In many ways material wealth, status, rank, and power get in the way of what an organization is trying to accomplish. Thanks again for sharing your thoughts!
Downsizing has both advantages and disadvantages; avoiding quid pro quo is more sideshow distraction than then disruptive ideas Boyd wanted to inject into the defense bureaucracy. Near zero material wealth may help clear mental distraction and provide a gimmick to help communicate ideas to those who hold unquestioned assumptions about post military work. In other words, like Zeno, Boyd used his impoverished lifestyle as a way to challenge sacred assumptions and thereby get people to view his disruptive ideas as useful.
Gr8 post - thanks for sharing! Re: OODA "loop" & WWI/II, fortunately the Germans didn't user it on the strategic and grand strategic levels 🙃
Need to reference Bill Lind and his novel "Victoria". He is Boyd's successor on 4th Generation Warfare.